# CROSSWALK **TERMINOLOGY** PROJECT

A collaborative project by the Managing Re-identification Risk (MRR) Working Group



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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Federal Privacy Council (FPC) Managing Re-identification Risk (MRR) Working Group undertook a project to identify and document terms that are relevant to managing reidentification risk, but may be used differently across professional domains. The definitions presented in this document were collected between June and December 2022 through a series of data calls to the following executive councils:

- 1. Chief Data Officers Council (CDOC)
- 2. Evaluation Officer Council (EOC)
- 3. Interagency Council on Statistical Policy (ICSP)
- 4. Federal Privacy Council (FPC)



All federal agencies are challenged to establish or improve the processes for disclosure avoidance in response to the Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018 (Evidence Act). As a result of the Evidence Act, an understanding of shared terminology is becoming increasingly more critical across the Federal Government. This document represents a collaborative effort to improve communication among information and data governance professionals.

The Crosswalk Terminology Project identified 24 terms that are relevant to managing reidentification risk, but may be used differently across professional domains. As critical partners in this federal agency-wide effort, the following councils contributed to this effort:

- 1. Chief Data Officers Council (CDOC)
- 2. Evaluation Officer Council (EOC)
- 3. Interagency Council on Statistical Policy (ICSP)
- 4. Federal Privacy Council (FPC)

## BACKGROUND

#### LEADERSHIP

The FPC MRR Working Group operates with the support and direction of the FPC Executive Committee. The working group is co-chaired by Shannan Catalano of ED's Student Privacy Policy Office and Jamie Huang of EPA's Privacy Office.

#### **MEMBERSHIP**

The FPC MRR Working Group is a community of practice for professionals who are working with disclosure avoidance programs that function as part of an agency privacy program. Members of the working group include disclosure review program managers, coordinators, disclosure review board chairs, or other persons fulfilling similar substantive and administrative roles within their agency. The working group is open to all federal agency staff interested in the group's focus.

#### MISSION AND STRATEGY

Informed by the Evidence Act, the FPC MRR Working Group's mission focuses on collaboration and key processes falling within the working group's scope. Mission and scope can evolve over time based on the guidance and recommendations of the FPC leadership.

#### Mission

- Improve communication among information and data governance professionals.
- Improve upon processes for managing disclosure avoidance and re-identification risk in response to the Evidence Act.

#### Strategy

- Collaborate with critical federal partners.
- Identify key processes to which the FPC MRR Working Group can contribute.

#### CHALLENGES

Establishing successful programs within existing privacy frameworks is complicated by two challenges:

- Coordinating with federal agencies among privacy professionals, technical methodologists, and IT professionals requires understanding of shared language to discuss complex disclosure avoidance concepts.
- Within and across federal agencies, disclosure avoidance programs must account for risks associated with the mosaic effect within a broader privacy framework. The mosaic effect is an especially complex issue because it has the potential to occur within and across federal agencies.

These issues are particularly important for disclosure avoidance programs operating with larger privacy programs in their federal agency. The issues are important even to federal departments and agencies not directly responding to Evidence Act requirements because federal staff must still engage with the broader community and professional domains, which include those who are responding to the requirements of the Evidence Act.

#### CONCLUDED PROJECT

Having a shared language around disclosure avoidance is becoming increasingly critical across the Federal Government. The FPC MRR Working Group completed this project to improve communication among information and data governance professionals by identifying terms that are not only relevant to managing re-identification risk, but also may be used differently across professional domains. Twenty-four terms have been identified.

### DATA CALL FOR TERMS/REFERENCES/SOURCES

Based on a data call to the Evidence Act Councils, the FPC MRR Working Group selected the following terms for this project:

| Accountability        | Formal Privacy              | Personally Identifiable |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| Anonymization         | Information in Identifiable | Information (PII)       |
| Availability          | Form (IIF)                  | Predictability          |
| Confidentiality       | Indirect Identifier         | Re-identification       |
| De-identification     | Integrity                   | Re-identification Risk  |
| Differential Privacy  | Linked or Linkable          | Sensitive PII           |
| Direct Identifier     | Information                 | Statistical Disclosure  |
|                       | Manageability               | Limitation              |
| Disclosure Avoidance  | Mathematical Privacy        | Other Terms Used        |
| Disclosure Limitation | Mosaic Effect               | (e.g., U.S. Person PII) |
| Disassociability      |                             |                         |

# TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

| TERMINOLOGY    | COUNCIL | DEFINITION   | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|----------------|---------|--|--|
| Accountability | FPC     | <ol> <li>(General context) Property that ensures the actions of an<br/>entity may be traced uniquely to the entity.</li> <li>(Systems security context) The security objective that<br/>generates the requirement for actions of an entity to<br/>be traced uniquely to that entity. This supports non-<br/>repudiation, deterrence, fault isolation, intrusion detection<br/>and prevention, and after action recovery and legal action.</li> <li>(Privacy context) A Fair Information Practice Principle<br/>(FIPP) privacy principle that refers to an organization's<br/>requirements to demonstrate their implementation of the<br/>FIPPs and applicable privacy requirements.</li> </ol> | CNSS 4099 from ISO/IEC 7498-<br>2:1989; NIST SP 800-33 (adapted);<br>OMB A-130 (adapted); Committee<br>on National Security Systems<br>(CNSS) Glossary: <u>https://www.niap-<br/>ccevs.org/Ref/CNSSI_4009.pdf</u>  |
| Accountability | CDOC    | _  | -  |
| Accountability | EOC     | Assigns responsibility for actions or achieving targeted results.  | _  |
| Accountability | ICSP    | Generally a deprecated term due to ambiguity and contradictory usage in the technical literature.  | NISTIR 8053 § 1.4.1, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>NIST.IR.8053.pdf</u>   |
| Anonymization  | FPC     | Process that removes the association between the<br>identifying dataset and the data subject. The description of<br>"anonymization" as a type of de-identification.  | NISTIR 8053 § 1.4.1, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>nist.ir.8053.pdf</u><br>NIST SP 800-122, Guide to<br>Protecting the Confidentiality<br>of Personally Identifiable<br>Information (PII): <u>https://nvlpubs.</u><br><u>nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/</u><br><u>nistspecialpublication800-122.pdf</u> |

| TERMINOLOGY             | COUNCIL | DEFINITION  | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|-------------------------|---------|---|--|
| Anonymization           | CDOC    | The process of making previously identifiable information<br>de-identified and for which a code or other association for<br>re-identification no longer exists. (In medical terms: data from<br>which the patient cannot be identified by the recipient of the<br>information.)                           | NISTIR 8053, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>NIST.IR.8053.pdf</u><br>NIST SP 800-122, Guide to<br>Protecting the Confidentiality<br>of Personally Identifiable<br>Information (PII): <u>https://nvlpubs.</u><br><u>nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/</u><br><u>nistspecialpublication800-122.pdf</u> |
| Anonymization           | EOC     | <ul><li>Process that removes the association between the identifying dataset and the data subject.</li><li>Anonymized data are data that have been de-identified and do not include a re-identification code.</li><li>To remove identifying information so the original source cannot be known.</li></ul> | NISTIR 8053, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>NIST.IR.8053.pdf</u><br>Student Privacy Glossary: <u>https://</u><br><u>studentprivacy.ed.gov/glossary</u>   |
| Anonymization           | ICSP    | _   | _  |
| Attribute<br>Disclosure | FPC     | _   | _  |
| Attribute<br>Disclosure | CDOC    | _   | -  |
| Attribute<br>Disclosure | EOC     | _   | _  |
| Attribute<br>Disclosure | ICSP    | Attribute disclosure occurs when an attribute or characteristic<br>about an identified individual (or entity) is revealed through a<br>data release.  | Federal Committee on Statistical<br>Methodology's Data Protection<br>Toolkit: <u>https://nces.ed.gov/fcsm/</u><br><u>dpt/content/1</u>   |

| TERMINOLOGY  | COUNCIL | DEFINITION  | REFERENCE SOURCE  |
|--------------|---------|---|---|
| Availability | FPC     | The term 'availability' means ensuring timely and reliable<br>access to and use of information. The property that data or<br>information is accessible and usable upon demand by an<br>authorized person. | Federal Information Security<br>Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA<br>2014), Public Law No: 113-283<br>(12/18/2014): <u>https://www.congress.</u><br>gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-<br>bill/2521           |
| Availability | CDOC    | Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.  | OMB A-130; 44 U.S.C. § 3552,<br>Managing Information as a Strategic<br>Asset: <u>https://www.whitehouse.</u><br>gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_<br>drupal_files/omb/circulars/A130/<br>a130revised.pdf     |
| Availability | EOC     | Timely and reliable access to and use of data and results.  | Adapted from E-Government Act<br>of 2002: <u>https://www.congress.</u><br>gov/107/plaws/publ347/PLAW-<br>107publ347.pdf   |
| Availability | ICSP    | Timely, reliable access to information or a service.  | NIST SP 800-152, A Profile for<br>U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key<br>Management Systems: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/</u><br><u>specialpublications/nist.sp.800-152.</u><br><u>pdf</u> |

| TERMINOLOGY                  | COUNCIL | DEFINITION  | REFERENCE SOURCE  |
|------------------------------|---------|---|---|
| Collection of<br>Information | FPC     | <ul> <li>A. The obtaining, causing to be obtained, soliciting, or requiring the disclosure to third parties or the public of facts or opinions by or for an agency, regardless of form or format, calling for either: <ol> <li>Answers to identical questions posed to, or identical reporting or recordkeeping requirements imposed on, ten or more persons, other than agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United States.</li> <li>Answers to questions posed to agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United States that are to be used for general statistical purposes.</li> </ol> </li> <li>B. Shall not include a collection of information described under section 3518(c)(1).</li> </ul> | 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3), Public Printing<br>and Documents: <u>https://www.</u><br><u>govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-</u><br><u>2021-title44/pdf/USCODE-2021-</u><br><u>title44-chap35-subchap1-sec3502.</u><br><u>pdf</u><br>Note that 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3)<br>is a FISMA-specific definition<br>applicable to federal information<br>systems. Under subsection (b), it<br>excludes information described as<br>a "collection of information" under<br>section 44 U.S.C. § 3518(c)(1). |
| Collection of<br>Information | CDOC    | _   | -   |
| Collection of<br>Information | EOC     | -   | -   |
| Collection of<br>Information | ICSP    | -   | -   |
| Confidentiality              | FPC     | The term "confidentiality" means preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information.  | OMB A-130; FIPS 200, 44 U.S.C.<br>§ 3542, Minimum Security<br>Requirements for Federal<br>Information and Information<br>Systems: <u>https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/</u><br><u>nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.200.pdf</u>  |
| Confidentiality              | CDOC    | Preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure,<br>including means for protecting personal privacy and<br>proprietary information.   | OMB A-130; 44 U.S.C. § 3552,<br>Managing Information as a Strategic<br>Asset: <u>https://www.whitehouse.</u><br>gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_<br>drupal_files/omb/circulars/A130/<br>a130revised.pdf_  |

| TERMINOLOGY             | COUNCIL | DEFINITION  | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|-------------------------|---------|---|--|
| Confidentiality         | EOC     | Preserving authorized restrictions on data access and<br>disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and<br>proprietary information and personally identifiable information<br>(PII). | Adapted from E-Government Act<br>of 2002: <u>https://www.congress.</u><br>gov/107/plaws/publ347/PLAW-<br>107publ347.pdf  |
| Confidentiality         | ICSP    | Confidentiality is the "property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized entities."   | NIST SP 800-152, A Profile for<br>U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key<br>Management Systems: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/</u><br><u>specialpublications/nist.sp.800-152.</u><br><u>pdf</u>  |
| Data Subject            | FPC     | While the term "data subject" is not used in the Privacy Act, see the definition of "individual."   | 5 U.S.C. § 552a, (a)(2), Public<br>information; agency rules, opinions,<br>orders, records, and proceedings:<br><u>https://uscode.house.gov/view.</u><br><u>xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-<br/>title5-section552#=0&amp;<br/>edition=prelim</u> |
| Data Subject            | CDOC    | -   | _  |
| Data Subject            | EOC     | -   | _  |
| Data Subject            | ICSP    | A data subject is any person, establishment, or other entity from or about whom data are collected.   | Federal Committee on Statistical<br>Methodology's Data Protection<br>Toolkit: <u>https://nces.ed.gov/fcsm/</u><br><u>dpt/content/1</u>   |
| Deductive<br>Disclosure | FPC     |   | _  |
| Deductive<br>Disclosure | CDOC    | -   | _  |

| TERMINOLOGY             | COUNCIL | DEFINITION   | REFERENCE SOURCE  |
|-------------------------|---------|--|---|
| Deductive<br>Disclosure | EOC     | The identification of an individual's identity using known characteristics of that individual.   | Deductive Disclosure Risk:<br><u>https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/</u><br><u>web/pages/DSDR/disclosure.</u><br><u>html#:~:text=Deductive%20</u><br><u>disclosure%20is%20the%20</u><br><u>identification,identify%20</u><br><u>respondents%20with%20unique%20</u><br><u>characteristics</u>   |
| Deductive<br>Disclosure | ICSP    | _  | _   |
| De-identification       | FPC     | General term for any process of removing the association between a set of identifying data and the data subject.   | NIST SP 800-53, Revision 5, Security<br>and Privacy Controls for Information<br>Systems and Organizations:<br><u>https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/</u><br><u>SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-</u><br><u>53r5.pdf</u>   |
| De-identification       | CDOC    | -  | -   |
| De-identification       | EOC     | Process of removing the association between a set of<br>identifying data and the data subject.<br>To adhere to promises of confidentiality made during the<br>informed consent process and to mitigate risks to data<br>providers for providing personally identifiable information (PII)<br>and sensitive data in the data package. | NISTIR 8053, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>NIST.IR.8053.pdf</u><br>Adapted from MCC Guidelines for<br>Transparent, Reproducible, and<br>Ethical Data and Documentation<br>(TREDD): <u>https://www.mcc.gov/</u><br><u>resources/pub-full/guidance-mcc-<br/>guidelines-tredd</u> |
| De-identification       | ICSP    | The process by which statistical disclosure limitation methods<br>are applied to reduce (not eliminate) the likelihood of disclosure<br>from the resulting data.   | Federal Committee on Statistical<br>Methodology's Data Protection<br>Toolkit, The Challenge of De-<br>Identification: <u>https://nces.ed.gov/</u><br><u>fcsm/dpt/content/1-3-2</u>  |

| TERMINOLOGY          | COUNCIL | DEFINITION  | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|----------------------|---------|---|--|
| Differential Privacy | FPC     | A set of techniques based on a mathematical definition of<br>identity disclosure and information leakage from operations on<br>a dataset. Differential privacy prevents disclosure by adding<br>non-deterministic noise (usually small random values) to the<br>results of mathematical operations before the results are<br>reported.<br>A system for publicly sharing information about a dataset by<br>describing the patterns of groups within the dataset while<br>withholding information about individuals in the dataset. | NISTIR 8053, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>NIST.IR.8053.pdf</u> |
| Differential Privacy | CDOC    | _   | _  |
| Differential Privacy | EOC     | A set of techniques based on a mathematical definition of<br>identity disclosure and information leakage from operations on<br>a dataset. Differential privacy prevents disclosure by adding<br>non-deterministic noise (usually small random values) to the<br>results of mathematical operations before the results are<br>reported.<br>A system for publicly sharing information about a dataset by<br>describing the patterns of groups within the dataset while<br>withholding information about individuals in the dataset. | NISTIR 8053, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>NIST.IR.8053.pdf</u> |

| TERMINOLOGY          | COUNCIL | DEFINITION  | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|----------------------|---------|---|--|
| Differential Privacy | ICSP    | Differential privacy is a rigorous mathematical definition of<br>privacy for statistical analysis and machine learning. In the<br>simplest setting, consider an algorithm that analyzes a dataset<br>and releases statistics about it (such as means and variances,<br>cross-tabulations, or the parameters of a machine learning<br>model). Such an algorithm is said to be differentially private if,<br>by looking at the output one cannot tell whether an individual's<br>data was included in the original dataset or not. In other words,<br>the guarantee of a differentially private algorithm is that its<br>behavior hardly changes when a single individual joins or<br>leaves the dataset; anything the algorithm might output on a<br>database containing some individual's information is almost as<br>likely to have come from a database without that individual's<br>information. Most notably, this guarantee holds for every<br>individual and every dataset. Therefore, regardless of how<br>eccentric any single individual's details are, and regardless of<br>the details of anyone else in the database, the guarantee that<br>individual-level information about participants in the database<br>is not leaked. Differential privacy achieves this strong guarantee<br>by carefully injecting random noise into computation of the<br>released statistics, so as to hide the effect of each individual. | What is Differential Privacy: <u>https://opendp.org/about</u>  |
| Direct Identifier    | FPC     | While the term "direct identifier" is not explicitly used in the<br>Privacy Act, the term "record" within the statute is used to<br>refer to information about an individual that is maintained<br>by an agency and "contains his name, or the identifying<br>number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the<br>individual, such as a finger or voice print or a photograph."<br>(Related: A "system of records" within the Privacy Act refers to<br>a group of records "from which information is retrieved by the<br>name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol,<br>or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.")  | 5 U.S.C. § 552a, (a)(4), and (5),<br>Public information; agency rules,<br>opinions, orders, records, and<br>proceedings: <u>https://uscode.house.</u><br>gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-<br>prelim-title5-section552#=0&<br>edition=prelim |
| Direct Identifier    | CDOC    | _   | _  |

| TERMINOLOGY             | COUNCIL | DEFINITION   | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|-------------------------|---------|--|--|
| Direct Identifier       | EOC     | Data that directly identifies an individual; examples include personally identifiable information (PII) such as names, social security numbers, and email addresses.   | Adapted from NISTIR 8053,<br>De-Identification of Personal<br>Information: <u>https://nvlpubs.nist.</u><br>gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/NIST.IR.8053.<br>pdf   |
| Direct Identifier       | ICSP    | A direct identifier is a data element with a 1:1 relationship<br>to a data subject that can be used to uniquely identify that<br>individual or entity, such as a Social Security Number, Tax<br>Identification Number, or other unique pieces of information.<br>As such, provision of a direct identifier by definition leads to<br>identity disclosure.  | Federal Committee on Statistical<br>Methodology's Data Protection<br>Toolkit: <u>https://nces.ed.gov/fcsm/</u><br><u>dpt/content/1-3-2</u>   |
| Disclosure              | FPC     | While the Privacy Act does not explicitly define what<br>"disclosure" means, it uses the term in the context of sharing<br>"any record which is contained in a system of records by any<br>means of communication to any person, or to another agency."  | 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b), Public<br>information; agency rules, opinions,<br>orders, records, and proceedings:<br><u>https://uscode.house.gov/view.</u><br><u>xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-<br/>title5-section552#=0&amp;<br/>edition=prelim</u> |
| Disclosure              | CDOC    | _  | _  |
| Disclosure              | EOC     | _  | -  |
| Disclosure              | ICSP    | Disclosure is a concept that can mean different things in<br>different contexts. Within the context of the Data Protection<br>Toolkit, disclosure entails the release or exposure of information<br>that was supposed to be confidential. Disclosure of confidential<br>information about a data subject can take one of three<br>forms: identity disclosure, attribute disclosure, and inferential<br>disclosure. | Federal Committee on Statistical<br>Methodology's Data Protection<br>Toolkit: <u>https://nces.ed.gov/fcsm/</u><br><u>dpt/content/1</u>   |
| Disclosure<br>Avoidance | FPC     | _  | —  |

| TERMINOLOGY              | COUNCIL | DEFINITION  | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|--------------------------|---------|---|--|
| Disclosure<br>Avoidance  | CDOC    | _   | _  |
| Disclosure<br>Avoidance  | EOC     | Efforts made to de-identify data in order to reduce the risk of disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII).  | Student Privacy Glossary: <u>https://</u><br><u>studentprivacy.ed.gov/glossary</u>   |
| Disclosure<br>Avoidance  | ICSP    | Colloquial term for "Statistical Disclosure Limitation."  | _  |
| Disclosure<br>Limitation | FPC     | -   | -  |
| Disclosure<br>Limitation | CDOC    | -   | _  |
| Disclosure<br>Limitation | EOC     | A technique used to manipulate the data prior to release to<br>minimize the risk of inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of<br>personally identifiable information (PII).   | Student Privacy Glossary: <u>https://</u><br><u>studentprivacy.ed.gov/glossary</u>   |
| Disclosure<br>Limitation | ICSP    | See "Statistical Disclosure Limitation."  | -  |
| Disclosure Risk          | FPC     | -   | -  |
| Disclosure Risk          | CDOC    | _   | -  |
| Disclosure Risk          | EOC     | -   | -  |
| Disclosure Risk          | ICSP    | The likelihood that: 1) an individual's (or entity's) identity can be<br>determined through linkage to an external data source (identity<br>disclosure); and 2) an attribute can be learned or better inferred<br>about the individual (attribute or inferential disclosure). | Federal Committee on Statistical<br>Methodology's Data Protection<br>Toolkit: <u>https://nces.ed.gov/fcsm/</u><br><u>dpt/content/1-3-4</u> |
| Disassociability         | FPC     | -   | _  |
| Disassociability         | CDOC    | _   | _  |

| TERMINOLOGY      | COUNCIL | DEFINITION   | REFERENCE SOURCE  |
|------------------|---------|--|---|
| Disassociability | EOC     | Enabling the processing of personally identifiable information (PII) or events without association to individuals or devices beyond the operational requirements of the system.  | NISTIR 8062, An Introduction<br>to Privacy Engineering and Risk<br>Management in Federal Systems:<br><u>https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/</u><br><u>ir/2017/NIST.IR.8062.pdf</u> |
| Disassociability | ICSP    | _  | -   |
| Dissemination    | FPC     | It should also be noted that "dissemination" is treated as a<br>distinct information action in OMB Circular A-130 (e.g., handling<br>personally identifiable information (PII) involves "creation,<br>collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination,<br>disclosure, and disposal").<br>A-130 defines "dissemination" as "the government-initiated       | OMB A-130, Managing Information<br>as a Strategic Asset: <u>https://www.</u><br>whitehouse.gov/wp-content/<br>uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/<br>circulars/A130/a130revised.pdf  |
|                  |         | distribution of information to a nongovernment entity, including<br>the public." It explicitly excludes "distribution limited to Federal<br>Government employees, intra- or interagency use or sharing<br>of Federal information, and responses to requests for agency<br>records under the Freedom of Information Act or the Privacy<br>Act" from the definitional scope. |   |
| Dissemination    | CDOC    | _  | —   |
| Dissemination    | EOC     | _  | -   |
| Dissemination    | ICSP    | —  | _   |
| Formal Privacy   | FPC     | _  | _   |
| Formal Privacy   | CDOC    | _  | _   |
| Formal Privacy   | EOC     | Not used in the evaluation community.  | -   |

| TERMINOLOGY         | COUNCIL | DEFINITION  | REFERENCE SOURCE  |
|---------------------|---------|---|---|
| Formal Privacy      | ICSP    | Every data release results in a loss of some privacy, if only<br>in a probabilistic sense by allowing the data user to make<br>slightly more accurate inferences about people, households,<br>or businesses (Dwork and Naor, 2010). A formally private<br>approach quantifies the amount of privacy loss in any release<br>and requires the total privacy loss from a data release not<br>exceed a certain budget. This type of method protects against<br>a worst case with respect to what information a data user has<br>external to the agency-provided data. A larger privacy budget<br>may allow the data provider to release a greater quantity or<br>quality of data but also creates more privacy loss. Furthermore,<br>unlike traditional disclosure avoidance methods, formally<br>private methods must work even if the entire methodology is<br>publicly known, including parameters. Ideally, the code would<br>even be posted publicly, as long as the seeds for random<br>number generators were not revealed. This limitation prevents<br>the user from undoing the disclosure avoidance in any one<br>instance but allows a complete picture of how the data were<br>protected in a probabilistic sense. Differential Privacy is one<br>type of Formal Privacy. | Freiman, Michael H., Rodriguez,<br>Rolando A., Reiter, Jerome P., and<br>Lauger, Amy. "Formal Privacy<br>and Synthetic Data for the<br>American Community Survey":<br><u>https://nces.ed.gov/FCSM/pdf/</u><br>D5FreimanRodriguezReiter.<br>pdf#:~:text=A%20formally%20<br>private%20approach%20<br>guantifies%20the%20amount%20<br>of,data%20user%20has%20<br>external%20to%20the%20agency-<br>provided%20data. |
| Identity Disclosure | FPC     | -   |   |
| Identity Disclosure | CDOC    | -   |   |
| Identity Disclosure | EOC     | -   | -   |
| Identity Disclosure | ICSP    | Identity disclosure occurs when it is possible to directly identify a specific individual (or entity) in a data release.  | Federal Committee on Statistical<br>Methodology's Data Protection<br>Toolkit: <u>https://nces.ed.gov/fcsm/</u><br><u>dpt/content/1</u>  |

| TERMINOLOGY                | COUNCIL | DEFINITION  | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|----------------------------|---------|---|--|
| Individual/<br>U.S. Person | FPC     | The term "individual" means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.                                       | 5 U.S.C. § 552a, (a)(2), Public<br>information; agency rules, opinions,<br>orders, records, and proceedings:<br><u>https://uscode.house.gov/view.</u><br><u>xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-<br/>title5-section552#=0&amp;<br/>edition=prelim</u> |
| Individual/<br>U.S. Person | CDOC    | _   | _  |
| Individual/<br>U.S. Person | EOC     | _   | -  |
| Individual/<br>U.S. Person | ICSP    | —   | —  |
| Inferential<br>Disclosure  | FPC     | _   | -  |
| Inferential<br>Disclosure  | CDOC    | _   | -  |
| Inferential<br>Disclosure  | EOC     | _   | _  |
| Inferential<br>Disclosure  | ICSP    | Inferential disclosure occurs when information about a data<br>subject can be inferred with high confidence from statistical<br>properties of the data. | Federal Committee on Statistical<br>Methodology's Data Protection<br>Toolkit: <u>https://nces.ed.gov/fcsm/</u><br><u>dpt/content/1</u>   |

| TERMINOLOGY                                  | COUNCIL | DEFINITION  | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|--|---------|---|--|
| Information in<br>Identifiable Form<br>(IIF) | FPC     | <ul> <li>Any representation of information that permits the identity of<br/>an individual to whom the information applies to be reasonably<br/>inferred by either direct or indirect means.</li> <li>Information for data collection for program evaluation<br/>purposes:</li> <li>i. That directly identifies an individual (e.g., name, address,<br/>social security number or other identifying number or code,<br/>telephone number, email address) or</li> <li>ii. By which an agency intends to identify specific individuals<br/>in conjunction with other data elements, i.e., indirect<br/>identification. (These data elements may include a<br/>combination of gender, race, birth date, geographic<br/>indicator, and other descriptors.)</li> </ul>      | E-Government Act of 2002 § 208(d)<br>(Public Law 107-347, 44 U.S.C. §<br>3501): <u>https://www2.ed.gov/policy/</u><br><u>gen/leg/foia/om-6-108.pdf</u><br>OMB M-03-22, OMB Guidance for<br>Implementing the Privacy Provisions<br>of the E-Government Act of 2002:<br><u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-<br/>content/uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/memoranda/2003/</u><br><u>m03_22.pdf</u> |
| Information in<br>Identifiable Form<br>(IIF) | CDOC    | _   | -  |
| Information in<br>Identifiable Form<br>(IIF) | EOC     | <ul> <li>Any representation of information that permits the identity of<br/>an individual to whom the information applies to be reasonably<br/>inferred by either direct or indirect means.</li> <li>Information for data collection for program evaluation<br/>purposes: <ol> <li>That directly identifies an individual (e.g., name, address,<br/>social security number or other identifying number or code,<br/>telephone number, email address) or</li> <li>By which an agency intends to identify specific individuals<br/>in conjunction with other data elements, i.e., indirect<br/>identification. (These data elements may include a<br/>combination of gender, race, birth date, geographic<br/>indicator, and other descriptors.)</li> </ol> </li> </ul> | E-Government Act of 2002 § 208(d)<br>(Public Law 107-347,44 U.S.C. §<br>3501): <u>https://www2.ed.gov/policy/</u><br>gen/leg/foia/om-6-108.pdf<br>OMB M-03-22, OMB Guidance for<br>Implementing the Privacy Provisions<br>of the E-Government Act of 2002:<br><u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-<br/>content/uploads/legacy_drupal_<br/>files/omb/memoranda/2003/</u><br>m03_22.pdf           |
| Information in<br>Identifiable Form<br>(IIF) | ICSP    | _   | _  |

| TERMINOLOGY         | COUNCIL | DEFINITION   | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|---------------------|---------|--|--|
| Indirect Identifier | FPC     | While the term "indirect identifier" is not used in OMB Circular A-130, see definition of "Personally Identifiable Information."   | —  |
| Indirect Identifier | CDOC    | _  | -  |
| Indirect Identifier | EOC     | Information that can be used to identify an individual through<br>association (or combination) with other information; examples<br>include place of birth, birth date, and geographic indicators<br>such as zip codes.   | NISTIR 8053, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>NIST.IR.8053.pdf</u><br>Student Privacy Glossary: <u>https://</u><br><u>studentprivacy.ed.gov/glossary</u> |
| Indirect Identifier | ICSP    | An indirect identifier is a data element that may be combined<br>with other variables on the file or other external information<br>to identify a specific data subject. Name and birthdate are<br>good examples of indirect identifiers that can easily be used<br>in this manner. There may be numerous John Smiths in a given<br>population, and there may be many individuals that share the<br>same birthdate in that population, but there may be only one<br>John Smith with a particular birthdate. As such, the provision of<br>indirect identifiers can lead to identify, attribute, and inferential<br>disclosure. | Federal Committee on Statistical<br>Methodology's Data Protection<br>Toolkit: <u>https://nces.ed.gov/fcsm/</u><br><u>dpt/content/1-3-2</u>   |
| Integrity           | FPC     | Guarding against improper information modification or<br>destruction, including ensuring information non-repudiation<br>and authenticity.  | OMB A-130, Managing Information<br>as a Strategic Asset: <u>https://www.</u><br>whitehouse.gov/wp-content/<br>uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/<br>circulars/A130/a130revised.pdf   |
| Integrity           | CDOC    | Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, including ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity.  | OMB A-130, Managing Information<br>as a Strategic Asset: <u>https://www.</u><br><u>whitehouse.gov/wp-content/</u><br><u>uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/</u><br><u>circulars/A130/a130revised.pdf</u>                                    |

| TERMINOLOGY COUNCIL DEFINITION RE   | REFERENCE SOURCE  |
|---|---|
| access or revision to ensure the data is not compromised<br>through corruption or falsification.<br>Safeguards against improper data modification or destruction,<br>including ensuring data non-repudiation and authenticity.<br>Guarding against improper data modification or destruction,<br>and including ensuring data non-repudiation and authenticity.<br>du<br>utt<br>du<br>du<br>du<br>du<br>du<br>du<br>du<br>du<br>du<br>du<br>du<br>du<br>du | Phase 4 Implementation of the<br>Foundations for Evidence-Based<br>Policymaking Act of 2018: Program<br>Evaluation Standards and Practices<br>OMB M-20-12): <u>https://www.<br/>whitehouse.gov/wp-content/</u><br><u>uploads/2020/03/M-20-12.pdf</u><br>mproving Implementation of the<br>nformation Quality Act (OMB M-19-<br>5): <u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-<br/>content/uploads/2019/04/M-19-15.</u> |

| TERMINOLOGY                       | COUNCIL | DEFINITION  | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|-----------------------------------|---------|---|--|
| Integrity                         | ICSP    | A property whereby data has not been altered in an<br>unauthorized manner since it was created, transmitted, or<br>stored.  | NIST SP 800-152, A Profile for<br>U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key<br>Management Systems: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/</u><br><u>specialpublications/nist.sp.800-152.</u><br><u>pdf</u>                  |
| Linked or Linkable<br>Information | FPC     | "Linked or linkable information" is incorporated in the definition<br>of "Personally Identifiable Information":<br>Information that can be used to distinguish or trace an<br>individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other<br>information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual.                       | OMB A-130, Managing Information<br>as a Strategic Resource: <u>https://</u><br><u>www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/</u><br><u>files/omb/assets/OMB/circulars/al</u><br><u>30/a130revised.pdf</u>                           |
| Linked or Linkable<br>Information | CDOC    | _   | -  |
| Linked or Linkable<br>Information | EOC     | Linked information is information about or related to an<br>individual that is logically associated with other information<br>about the individual.<br>Linkable information is information about or related to an<br>individual for which there is a possibility of logical association<br>with other information about the individual. | NIST SP 800-122, Guide to<br>Protecting the Confidentiality<br>of Personally Identifiable<br>Information (PII): <u>https://nvlpubs.</u><br><u>nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/</u><br><u>nistspecialpublication800-122.pdf</u> |
| Linked or Linkable<br>Information | ICSP    | Information that is associated with a particular data subject or<br>that can be associated with a particular data subject by linkage<br>via Direct Identifiers, Indirect Identifiers, or Pseudo-identifiers.  | -  |
| Manageability                     | FPC     | Providing the capability for granular administration of data, including alteration, deletion, and selective disclosure.   | NIST Privacy Framework (Jan<br>2020): <u>https://www.nist.gov/privacy-</u><br><u>framework/privacy-framework</u>   |
| Manageability                     | CDOC    | -   | -  |

| TERMINOLOGY             | COUNCIL | DEFINITION   | REFERENCE SOURCE  |
|-------------------------|---------|--|---|
| Manageability           | EOC     | Providing the capability for granular administration of personally identifiable information (PII), including alteration, deletion, and selective disclosure.   | NISTIR 8062, An Introduction<br>to Privacy Engineering and Risk<br>Management in Federal Systems:<br><u>https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/</u><br><u>ir/2017/NIST.IR.8062.pdf</u>                               |
| Manageability           | ICSP    | —  | -   |
| Mathematical<br>Privacy | FPC     | —  | _   |
| Mathematical<br>Privacy | CDOC    | _  | _   |
| Mathematical<br>Privacy | EOC     | _  | _   |
| Mathematical<br>Privacy | ICSP    | See "Formal Privacy"   | _   |
| Mosaic Effect           | FPC     | The mosaic effect occurs when the information in an individual dataset, in isolation, may not pose a risk of identifying an individual (or threatening some other important interest such as security) but when combined with other available information, could pose such risk. Before disclosing potential personally identifiable information (PII) or other potentially sensitive information, agencies must consider other publicly available data—in any medium and from any source—to determine whether some combination of existing data and the data intended to be publicly released could allow for the identification of an individual or pose another security concern. | OMB M-13-13, Open Data Policy—<br>Managing Information as an Asset:<br><u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-</u><br><u>content/uploads/legacy_drupal_</u><br><u>files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-13.</u><br><u>pdf</u> |

| TERMINOLOGY                                     | COUNCIL | DEFINITION   | REFERENCE SOURCE  |
|---|---------|--|---|
| Mosaic Effect                                   | CDOC    | The mosaic effect occurs when the information in an individual dataset, in isolation, may not pose a risk of identifying an individual (or threatening some other important interest such as security), but when combined with other available information could pose such risk. Before disclosing potential personally identifiable information (PII) or other potentially sensitive information, agencies must consider other publicly available data—in any medium and from any source—to determine whether some combination of existing data and the data intended to be publicly released could allow for the identification of an individual or pose another security concern. | OMB M-13-13, Open Data Policy—<br>Managing Information as an Asset:<br><u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-<br/>content/uploads/legacy_drupal_</u><br><u>files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-13.</u><br><u>pdf</u>   |
| Mosaic Effect                                   | EOC     | Occurs when the information in an individual dataset used<br>for program evaluation, in isolation, may not pose a risk of<br>identifying an individual (or threatening some other important<br>interest such as security), but when combined with other<br>available information could pose such risk.   | Adapted from OMB M-13-13, Open<br>Data Policy—Managing Information<br>as an Asset: <u>https://project-open-</u><br><u>data.cio.gov/policy-memo/</u>   |
| Mosaic Effect                                   | ICSP    | The mosaic effect occurs when the information in an individual dataset, in isolation, may not pose a risk of identifying an individual (or threatening some other important interest such as security), but when combined with other available information could pose such risk. Before disclosing potential personally identifiable information (PII) or other potentially sensitive information, agencies must consider other publicly available data—in any medium and from any source—to determine whether some combination of existing data and the data intended to be publicly released could allow for the identification of an individual or pose another security concern. | OMB M-13-13, Open Data Policy—<br>Managing Information as an Asset:<br><u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-<br/>content/uploads/legacy_drupal_</u><br><u>files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-13.</u><br><u>pdf</u>   |
| Personally<br>Identifiable<br>Information (PII) | FPC     | Information that can be used to distinguish or trace an<br>individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other<br>information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual.   | OMB A-130, Managing Information<br>as a Strategic Resource: <u>https://</u><br><u>www.whitehouse.gov/sites/</u><br><u>whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/</u><br><u>A130/a130revised.pdf</u> , also available<br>at <u>https://www.fpc.gov/resources/</u><br><u>glossary/#S</u> |

| TERMINOLOGY                                     | COUNCIL | DEFINITION   | REFERENCE SOURCE  |
|---|---------|--|---|
| Personally<br>Identifiable<br>Information (PII) | CDOC    | Personally identifiable information (PII) is information that can<br>be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, either<br>alone or when combined with other information that is linked<br>or linkable to a specific individual. Because there are many<br>different types of information that can be used to distinguish<br>or trace an individual's identity, the term PII is necessarily<br>broad. To determine whether information is PII, the agency shall<br>perform an assessment of the specific risk that an individual<br>can be identified using the information with other information<br>that is linked or linkable to the individual. In performing this<br>assessment, it is important to recognize information that is not<br>PII can become PII whenever additional information becomes<br>available—in any medium or from any source—that would make<br>it possible to identify an individual. | OMB A-130, Managing Information<br>as a Strategic Resource: <u>https://</u> <u>www.whitehouse.gov/sites/</u> <u>whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/</u> <u>A130/a130revised.pdf</u> , also available<br>at <u>https://www.fpc.gov/resources/</u> <u>glossary/#S</u>             |
| Personally<br>Identifiable<br>Information (PII) | EOC     | Information that can be used to distinguish or trace an<br>individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other<br>information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual.   | OMB A-130, Managing Information<br>as a Strategic Resource: <u>https://</u><br><u>www.whitehouse.gov/sites/</u><br><u>whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/</u><br><u>A130/a130revised.pdf</u> , also available<br>at <u>https://www.fpc.gov/resources/</u><br><u>glossary/#S</u> |
| Personally<br>Identifiable<br>Information (PII) | ICSP    | _  | _   |
| Privacy Impact<br>Assessment                    | FPC     | An analysis of how information is handled to ensure<br>handling conforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy<br>requirements regarding privacy; to determine the risks and<br>effects of creating, collecting, using, processing, storing,<br>maintaining, disseminating, disclosing, and disposing of<br>information in identifiable form in an electronic information<br>system; and to examine and evaluate protections and alternate<br>processes for handling information to mitigate potential privacy<br>concerns. A privacy impact assessment is both an analysis and<br>a formal document detailing the process and the outcome of<br>the analysis.   | OMB A-130, 10.a.63: <u>https://</u><br>obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/<br>sites/default/files/omb/assets/OMB/<br>circulars/a130/a130revised.pdf   |

| TERMINOLOGY                  | COUNCIL | DEFINITION   | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|------------------------------|---------|--|--|
| Privacy Impact<br>Assessment | CDOC    | _  | _  |
| Privacy Impact<br>Assessment | EOC     | A decision tool used to identify and mitigate privacy risks associated with the data collected and used in a program evaluation.   | _  |
| Privacy Impact<br>Assessment | ICSP    | _  | —  |
| Pseudo-identifier            | FPC     | _  | _  |
| Pseudo-identifier            | CDOC    | _  | _  |
| Pseudo-identifier            | EOC     | _  | _  |
| Pseudo-identifier            | ICSP    | A pseudo-identifier is a type of indirect identifier that may not<br>be an obvious candidate for attempting re-identification (e.g.,<br>movie ratings), but that can be used in the proper context as a<br>key linking variable to re-identify the individuals in a dataset.   | Federal Committee on Statistical<br>Methodology's Data Protection<br>Toolkit: <u>https://nces.ed.gov/fcsm/</u><br><u>dpt/content/1-3-2</u>   |
| Pseudonymization             | FPC     | A particular type of de-identification that both removes<br>the association with a data subject and adds an association<br>between a particular set of characteristics relating to the<br>data subject and one or more pseudonyms. Typically,<br>pseudonymization is implemented by replacing direct<br>identifiers with a pseudonym, such as a randomly generated<br>value. Pseudonymization is the processing of personal<br>information in a manner that renders the personal information<br>no longer attributable to a specific consumer without the use of<br>additional information, provided that the additional information<br>is kept separately and is subject to technical and organizational<br>measures to ensure the personal information is not attributed<br>to an identified or identifiable consumer. | NISTIR 8053 from ISO/TS 25237;<br>ISO 29100 Privacy Framework;<br>ISO 25237 Health Informatics—<br>Pseudonymization, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>nist.ir.8053.pdf</u> |
| Pseudonymization             | CDOC    | _  | -  |

| TERMINOLOGY              | COUNCIL | DEFINITION  | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|--------------------------|---------|---|--|
| Pseudonymization         | EOC     | _   | -  |
| Pseudonymization         | ICSP    | _   | -  |
| Predictability           | FPC     | Enabling reliable assumptions by individuals, owners, and operators about data and their processing by a system, product, or service.   | NIST Privacy Framework (January<br>2020): <u>https://www.nist.gov/privacy-</u><br><u>framework/privacy-framework</u>   |
| Predictability           | CDOC    | _   | -  |
| Predictability           | EOC     | Enabling reliable assumptions by individuals, owners, and operators about data and their processing by a system, product, or service.   | NISTIR 8062, An Introduction<br>to Privacy Engineering and Risk<br>Management in Federal Systems:<br><u>https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/</u><br>ir/2017/NIST.IR.8062.pdf |
| Predictability           | ICSP    | _   | -  |
| Re-identification        | FPC     | Re-identification is the process of attempting to discern the<br>identities that have been removed from de-identified data.<br>Because an important goal of de-identification is to prevent<br>unauthorized re-identification, such attempts are sometimes<br>called re-identification attacks. | NISTIR 8053, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>nist.ir.8053.pdf</u>                         |
| <b>Re-identification</b> | CDOC    | _   | -  |
| Re-identification        | EOC     | Any process that re-establishes the relationship between identifying data and an evaluation data subject.   | Adapted from NISTIR 8053,<br>De-Identification of Personal<br>Information: <u>https://nvlpubs.nist.</u><br>gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/NIST.IR.8053.<br>pdf                       |
| Re-identification        | ICSP    | Re-identification is the process of attempting to discern the identities that have been removed from de-identified data.  | NISTIR 8053, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>NIST.IR.8053.pdf</u>                         |

| TERMINOLOGY               | COUNCIL | DEFINITION   | REFERENCE SOURCE  |
|---------------------------|---------|--|---|
| Re-identification<br>Risk | FPC     | Though not an explicit definition, the Evidence Act speaks to<br>"risks and restrictions related to the disclosure of personally<br>identifiable information (PII), including the risk that an<br>individual data asset in isolation does not pose a privacy or<br>confidentiality risk but when combined with other available<br>information may pose such a risk."   | 44 U.S.C. § 3504(b)(6)(A); 44<br>U.S.C. § 3511(a)(2)(E)(i), Authority<br>and Functions of Director:<br><u>https://uscode.house.gov/view.</u><br><u>xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-<br/>title44-section3504#=0&amp;<br/>edition=prelim</u> |
| Re-identification<br>Risk | CDOC    | _  | _   |
| Re-identification<br>Risk | EOC     | The risk that de-identified records can be re-identified.  | NISTIR 8053, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>NIST.IR.8053.pdf</u>  |
| Re-identification<br>Risk | ICSP    | See "Disclosure Risk"  | _   |
| Rule of 10                | FPC     | _  | -   |
| Rule of 10                | CDOC    | This is the basic rule that Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) uses to mitigate re-identification risk. Basically, in a given data set, the rule prohibits any combination of data fields in a single dataset that, at the row level, has less than 10 individuals in a given grouping when aggregated. So it is not just less than 10 employees, but also if there is a work unit with 20 people and data fields include gender, job series, and race data revealing only 2 Black female statisticians. In this case, one or more columns would be removed to preserve the rule of 10. The other way this is done is to aggregate up until they can't be identified. FEVS (see https://www.doi.gov/pmb/hr/doifevs): "The 2022 FEVS will include:Detailed reporting will resume at the lower levels, with offices smaller than 10 employees consolidated with larger offices to preserve anonymity." |   |
| Rule of 10                | EOC     | _  | -   |

| TERMINOLOGY  | COUNCIL | DEFINITION   | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|--|---------|--|--|
| Rule of 10   | ICSP    | —  | —  |
| Secondary Use  | FPC     | -  | -  |
| Secondary Use  | CDOC    | _  | —  |
| Secondary Use  | EOC     | The use of data, either personally identifiable information (PII)<br>or de-identified, for a research or evaluation use other than the<br>original use for which it was collected.                         | _  |
| Secondary Use  | ICSP    | _  | _  |
| Sensitive<br>Personally<br>Identifiable<br>Information (PII) | FPC     | _  | _  |
| Sensitive<br>Personally<br>Identifiable<br>Information (PII) | CDOC    | _  | _  |
| Sensitive<br>Personally<br>Identifiable<br>Information (PII) | EOC     | Personal information that specifically identifies an individual<br>and, if such information is exposed to unauthorized access,<br>may cause harm to that individual at a moderate or high impact<br>level. | The Privacy Act and Personally<br>Identifiable Information (5 FAM<br>460): <u>https://fam.state.gov/</u><br>FAM/05FAM/05FAM0460.html |
| Sensitive<br>Personally<br>Identifiable<br>Information (PII) | ICSP    | _  | _  |
| Statistical<br>Disclosure<br>Limitation                      | FPC     | _  | _  |

| TERMINOLOGY                             | COUNCIL | DEFINITION   | REFERENCE SOURCE   |
|---|---------|--|--|
| Statistical<br>Disclosure<br>Limitation | CDOC    | _  | _  |
| Statistical<br>Disclosure<br>Limitation | EOC     | Statistical Disclosure Limitation is the discipline concerned with<br>the modification of statistical data in order to prevent third<br>parties working with these data from recognizing individuals in<br>the data.<br>Disclosure limitation is listed above.   | NISTIR 8053, De-Identification<br>of Personal Information: <u>https://</u><br><u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/</u><br><u>NIST.IR.8053.pdf</u> |
| Statistical<br>Disclosure<br>Limitation | ICSP    | Agencies rely on a set of techniques that assess the overall<br>disclosure risk of any particular record, variable, or value,<br>then treat the data in one or more ways to reduce the risk<br>of disclosure when making their data assets accessible to<br>data users. Together, these various techniques used to assess<br>and treat the data represent a branch of statistics known as<br>Statistical Disclosure Limitation (SDL) methods. The goal of any<br>application of SDL methods is to reduce the risk of disclosure<br>to an acceptable level, while maximizing the accuracy and<br>fitness-for-use of the resulting data for their intended purposes. | Federal Committee on Statistical<br>Methodology's Data Protection<br>Toolkit: <u>https://nces.ed.gov/fcsm/</u><br><u>dpt/content/1</u>             |

(Note: "-" indicates that a definition and reference source were not provided.)